WebAuthn PRF and largeBlob extensions
Derives a secret from a passkey or stores a small blob on it.
In one line
Can use your passkey to make an encryption key or store a tiny note on it
Derives a secret from a passkey or stores a small blob on it.
Lets an app use the passkey as a key for end to end encryption (PRF is a 32 byte HMAC output). largeBlob stores small data on the authenticator.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: You tap Unlock or Sign in on an app that protects your data with a passkey
It can
- Ask your passkey to make a secret value, 32 bytes long, for locking your data
- Lock and unlock your data on your device with that secret
- Store a small piece of data on a security key that supports it
It cannot
- Get your passkey's private key
- Make the secret without your passkey confirmation
- Store large files on the passkey
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | 67 | 2018-05-29 | None |
| Edge | Supported | 18 | 2018-10-02 | None |
| Firefox | Supported | 60 | 2018-05-09 | Only supports USB U2F tokens. |
| Safari | Supported | 13 | 2019-09-19 | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | 13 | 2019-09-19 | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | 70 | 2018-10-17 | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | 10.0 | 2019-08-22 | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | extensions:{prf:{eval:{first}}, largeBlob:{read|write}} |
| Browser compat keys | api.PublicKeyCredential |
| How access is granted | prompt |
| What the user sees | Same passkey prompt |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | Yes |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Per origin |
| How to take it back | Site settings |
| Inside an iframe | Same as top level; cross-origin iframes need a permissions policy where listed |
Typical flow
- Call the API
- Browser applies its access rules
- Page receives the result
Data you get
What comes back: Derives a secret from a passkey or stores a small blob on it.
Shape: object
How often: on demand
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
prf.results.first | binary | bytes | 32 bytes | deterministic per credential and salt |
largeBlob.blob | binary | bytes | typically up to about 1 KB on current authenticators | Not listed |
Technical limits
- Support varies by authenticator and OS
- Firefox PRF partial (macOS and Windows 139+, not Android)
- Safari status unclear; largeBlob support not verified
The story
What it is
Lets a site use your passkey as the key to lock and unlock your private data.
For you
You may notice a notes or vault app that unlocks with your face or fingerprint and no extra password. The same tap that signs you in also opens your encrypted data.
For makers
Makers of private apps can offer end to end encryption without asking for a separate master password. It improves security and convenience, and it lets them say even they cannot read user data.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| productivity | A password manager web vault unlocks with a passkey, so there is no master password to forget. | 1Password, Bitwarden |
| messaging | A secure notes or chat web app derives its encryption key from the passkey, so messages stay unreadable on its servers. | None named |
| health | A health records web app encrypts files with a passkey derived key so a data leak exposes nothing readable. | None named |
| creative | A cloud drafts tool encrypts unpublished writing and designs with a key that only the person's device can unlock. | None named |
| games | A browser game launcher could encrypt saved credentials and payment tokens with the passkey, so a stolen database is useless. | None named |
| security | A security team uses it to protect secrets in the browser without storing a key in a cookie. | None named |
Risks
- Lose the passkey, lose the data
- Support still maturing
What the platform says
- MDN (standards docs): WebAuthn extensions (PRF). Documents an extension that lets a site derive secret keys from a passkey for tasks like end to end encryption.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Passkey based encryption keys
- Zero knowledge vaults
Known abuse
- Misuse is limited by origin binding
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 3 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 4 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 2 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | Not rated | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2023, Chrome 116: PRF in Chrome
- 2026-02, Chrome: Windows Hello hmac-secret support (KB5077181) enables PRF on Windows
Sources
How well checked: Inferred from related behavior.