Autofill and autocomplete tokens
Form fields can ask the browser to fill saved name, email, phone, address and birthday.
In one line
Can ask your browser to fill saved name, email, phone and address
Form fields can ask the browser to fill saved name, email, phone, address and birthday.
Browser autofill puts personal data into inputs. Pages see it only after fill (often after user interaction on Chrome).
What it can and can't do
What the user does: You tap a form field and choose a suggestion, or click first on some sites.
It can
- Fill name, email, phone, address and birthday from your saved details
- Fill the fields it marks with the right label
- Offer them as soon as you tap a field
It cannot
- See saved details before you pick them, on most browsers
- Fill details you never saved
- Fill fields in a hidden form without your tap in most cases
- Ignore your turning autofill off
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | 14 | 2011-09-16 | None |
| Edge | Supported | 12 | 2015-07-29 | None |
| Firefox | Supported | 4 | 2011-03-22 | None |
| Safari | Supported | 6 | 2012-07-25 | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | 6 | 2012-09-10 | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | 18 | 2012-06-27 | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | 1.0 | 2013-04-27 | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | <input autocomplete='name|email|tel|street-address|postal-code|cc-number|bday|sex|organization|one-time-code'> |
| Browser compat keys | html.global_attributes.autocomplete |
| How access is granted | gesture |
| What the user sees | Autofill dropdown; some sites need a click before values are readable |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | Yes |
| Needs a user gesture | Yes |
| How long it lasts | Per origin |
| How to take it back | Site settings |
| Inside an iframe | Same as top level; cross-origin iframes need a permissions policy where listed |
Typical flow
- Call the API
- Browser applies its access rules
- Page receives the result
Data you get
What comes back: Form fields can ask the browser to fill saved name, email, phone, address and birthday.
Shape: object
How often: on demand
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
name, honorific-prefix, given-name, family-name | string | None | free text | Not listed |
email, tel, tel-national | string | None | free text | Not listed |
street-address, address-line1, address-level1/2, postal-code, country | string | None | free text | Not listed |
cc-name, cc-number, cc-exp, cc-csc | string | None | Chrome fills cards after confirmation; csc needs extra step | Not listed |
bday, sex, organization, username | string | None | free text | Not listed |
Technical limits
- Hidden fields can be filled by some autofill; browsers mitigate
- Payment fields need user confirmation
- Not a read API: the site only sees what the form posts
The story
What it is
Forms can ask your browser to fill name, email, phone, address and more.
For you
You tap one form field, pick your saved info, and many fields fill at once. Some hidden fields can fill too, so check what you share.
For makers
Makers add the right labels so your browser can fill signup and checkout forms. It lifts signups, but hidden fields can collect more than you meant to share.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| shopping | A checkout form fills name, address and phone in one tap. | Shopify stores |
| social | A signup page fills your email and birthday. | Facebook, X |
| travel | A booking form fills passenger details. | Expedia |
| ads | A lead form fills fields for you, and you send more info than you thought. | None named |
| security | A hidden field on a form collects phone or address that you never saw. | None named |
| banking | A loan form fills name and address, but you review the rest. | None named |
Risks
- Hidden field harvesting
- Over sharing
What the platform says
- Mozilla: autocomplete attribute. MDN says the attribute tells browsers what kind of data a form field wants, so they can autofill it.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Faster checkout
- Sign up
Known abuse
- Harvesting hidden field autofill (known abuse by ad scripts)
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 5 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 4 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 1 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | Not rated | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2012, Chrome 14: autocomplete tokens defined in the HTML spec (autofill honoured earlier)
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.