Microarchitectural timing attacks (Spectre, DrawnApart, cache side channels)
Uses precise timing to read CPU cache or GPU execution quirks.
In one line
Can use very exact timing to learn how your processor or graphics chip behaves
Uses precise timing to read CPU cache or GPU execution quirks.
Browser JS can run cache side channels (prime+probe), Spectre variants and GPU timing fingerprints (DrawnApart, 2022) that identify a physical GPU by execution unit speeds. Defended by timer coarsening and site isolation.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. It happens when the page runs, and it takes many tries
It can
- Run tests that time your processor cache
- Use graphics timing to tell apart physical chips, as the DrawnApart research did in 2022
- Add the result to a device profile
It cannot
- Work well if the browser blurs the clock
- Ask permission first
- Directly open your files or passwords in modern browsers
- Know who you are by itself
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | 1 | 2008-12-11 | None |
| Edge | Supported | 79 | 2020-01-15 | None |
| Firefox | Supported | 1 | 2004-11-09 | None |
| Safari | Supported | 1 | 2003-06-23 | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | 1 | 2007-06-29 | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | 1 | Not listed | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | 5.0 | 2016-12-15 | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | performance.now(), SharedArrayBuffer clocks, WebGL/WebGPU timer queries |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | Not listed |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Not listed |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- Build a fine grained clock
- Run timed workloads
- Extract bits or hardware signature
Data you get
What comes back: Signature vectors
Shape: float
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
GPU timing vector | list | None | dozens of values | needs many seconds |
Technical limits
- Largely mitigated by Site Isolation and clock coarsening
- Research prototypes, not seen in typical fingerprinting scripts
The story
What it is
A script uses precise timing to read CPU cache or GPU behavior and could leak hidden data or identity.
For you
You never see it. After the Spectre discovery, browsers blurred their clocks and walled sites off from each other. These changes protect you from timing attacks that could read secrets.
For makers
For attackers, timing can show what the chip is doing, even across sites. For makers, it means browsers will limit precise timers unless a site proves it is isolated. Researchers also show it can identify specific chips.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| security | Researchers show that a web page could use timing to read data it should not see, which led to Spectre defenses. | None named |
| ads | A tracker could use GPU timing as a hardware fingerprint, as shown in the DrawnApart research. | DrawnApart (research) |
| games | A browser game that needs fast threads must now opt in to cross origin isolation to get precise timers. | None named |
| banking | A bank site is kept apart from other tabs so a bad page cannot time its way into reading balances. | None named |
| developer | Browser makers make timers coarser, then give them back only to isolated pages. | Chrome, Firefox, Safari |
| enterprise | A company runs a strict browser policy that isolates its web apps from untrusted pages. | None named |
| education | A university security class demos a timing attack in a lab to teach why timers are blurred. | None named |
Risks
- Can leak secrets or identity
- Browsers defend with blurred timers
- Mostly research and lab
What the platform says
- web.dev: Why COOP and COEP. Google explains that browsers added isolation and coarser timers because of Spectre style timing attacks.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- None
Known abuse
- Cross-origin data leaks, stable GPU identification
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 3 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 1 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 5 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2018-01, all: Spectre mitigations: timer clamping, site isolation (Chrome 67, Firefox 100 Fission)
- 2022-01, paper: DrawnApart (Laor et al., NDSS 2022) shows 98% GPU re-identification in 8 s
Related capabilities
Related
- High resolution timer precision. Can use a clock whose sharpness shows your browser and privacy mode
- Cross-origin isolation and SharedArrayBuffer clocks. Can use a very fine clock and shared memory, but only if the site opts in
Sources
- Laor et al., DrawnApart (NDSS 2022)
- Kocher et al., Spectre Attacks (2018)
- Oren et al., Spy in the Sandbox (CCS 2015)
How well checked: Based on official documentation.