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Platform.Ontology

Microarchitectural timing attacks (Spectre, DrawnApart, cache side channels)

Uses precise timing to read CPU cache or GPU execution quirks.

Used to track youSpeed and timingSide channelsWeb browsersWhile you use it

In one line

Can use very exact timing to learn how your processor or graphics chip behaves

Uses precise timing to read CPU cache or GPU execution quirks.

Browser JS can run cache side channels (prime+probe), Spectre variants and GPU timing fingerprints (DrawnApart, 2022) that identify a physical GPU by execution unit speeds. Defended by timer coarsening and site isolation.

What it can and can't do

What the user does: Nothing. It happens when the page runs, and it takes many tries

It can

  • Run tests that time your processor cache
  • Use graphics timing to tell apart physical chips, as the DrawnApart research did in 2022
  • Add the result to a device profile

It cannot

  • Work well if the browser blurs the clock
  • Ask permission first
  • Directly open your files or passwords in modern browsers
  • Know who you are by itself

Browser support

BrowserStatusFirst versionReleasedNote
ChromeSupported12008-12-11None
EdgeSupported792020-01-15None
FirefoxSupported12004-11-09None
SafariSupported12003-06-23None
Safari on iPhoneSupported12007-06-29None
Chrome on AndroidSupported1Not listedNone
Samsung InternetSupported5.02016-12-15None

How a site asks for it

APIperformance.now(), SharedArrayBuffer clocks, WebGL/WebGPU timer queries
How access is grantednone
What the user seesNot listed
Needs a secure context (HTTPS)No
Needs a user gestureNo
How long it lastsNot listed
How to take it backNot listed
Inside an iframeNot listed

Typical flow

  1. Build a fine grained clock
  2. Run timed workloads
  3. Extract bits or hardware signature

Data you get

What comes back: Signature vectors
Shape: float

FieldTypeUnitRangePrecision
GPU timing vectorlistNonedozens of valuesneeds many seconds

Technical limits

  • Largely mitigated by Site Isolation and clock coarsening
  • Research prototypes, not seen in typical fingerprinting scripts

The story

What it is

A script uses precise timing to read CPU cache or GPU behavior and could leak hidden data or identity.

For you

You never see it. After the Spectre discovery, browsers blurred their clocks and walled sites off from each other. These changes protect you from timing attacks that could read secrets.

For makers

For attackers, timing can show what the chip is doing, even across sites. For makers, it means browsers will limit precise timers unless a site proves it is isolated. Researchers also show it can identify specific chips.

Where you see it

TypeExampleApps
securityResearchers show that a web page could use timing to read data it should not see, which led to Spectre defenses.None named
adsA tracker could use GPU timing as a hardware fingerprint, as shown in the DrawnApart research.DrawnApart (research)
gamesA browser game that needs fast threads must now opt in to cross origin isolation to get precise timers.None named
bankingA bank site is kept apart from other tabs so a bad page cannot time its way into reading balances.None named
developerBrowser makers make timers coarser, then give them back only to isolated pages.Chrome, Firefox, Safari
enterpriseA company runs a strict browser policy that isolates its web apps from untrusted pages.None named
educationA university security class demos a timing attack in a lab to teach why timers are blurred.None named

Risks

  • Can leak secrets or identity
  • Browsers defend with blurred timers
  • Mostly research and lab

What the platform says

  • web.dev: Why COOP and COEP. Google explains that browsers added isolation and coarser timers because of Spectre style timing attacks.

Good uses and abuse

Legitimate uses

  • None

Known abuse

  • Cross-origin data leaks, stable GPU identification

Scores

ScoreValueMeaning
Sensitivity3 of 5How revealing the data is
Utility1 of 5How useful it is to honest apps
Friction0 of 5How much the user has to do
Fingerprint bits5Rough identifying entropy, when known

History

  • 2018-01, all: Spectre mitigations: timer clamping, site isolation (Chrome 67, Firefox 100 Fission)
  • 2022-01, paper: DrawnApart (Laor et al., NDSS 2022) shows 98% GPU re-identification in 8 s

Sources

How well checked: Based on official documentation.

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