Fingerprinting ban and ATT enforcement
Apple forbids deriving a device identity from signals to track someone who said no under ATT.
In one line
Can't rebuild your identity from phone details after you refuse tracking on iPhone
Apple forbids deriving a device identity from signals to track someone who said no under ATT.
Stops apps and SDKs from rebuilding an ID from IP, model, locale and similar signals after the person refused tracking. It is enforced mainly at App Review and by required reason API gating.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. You said no on the tracking prompt; Apple enforces it in review
It can
- Use ordinary details for fraud and app function, within Apple's rules
- Measure results in groups without naming you
- Use IP addresses on Android; Play does not ban it
It cannot
- Combine IP, model and language to build an ID on iPhone
- Hide it behind a consent banner
- Use blocked tracking sites after you said no
- Pass App Review if found doing it
How it differs between platforms: Apple bans fingerprinting even with a banner. Google Play does not ban matching and now allows IP use in ads.
On Android and iPhone
| Android | iPhone | |
|---|---|---|
| Status | Not supported | Removed |
| First version | Not available | iOS 14.5 |
| Permission or entitlement | Not listed | Not listed |
| Protection level | none | none |
| How access is granted | not-exposed | not-exposed |
| What the user sees | Not listed | Not listed |
| How long it lasts | Not listed | Not listed |
| How to take it back | Not listed | Not listed |
| Store policy | Google Play Ads policy: use the advertising ID for ads; persistent IDs allowed only for non-ad uses with privacy policy | App Review 5.1.2(i): no device or user fingerprinting; ATT rules |
| API | Not listed | Required reason APIs, privacy manifests, NSPrivacyTrackingDomains |
| Notes | Play does not ban probabilistic matching or IP use; Google changed its ad products to allow IP address use in Feb 2025 and the UK ICO criticised the change. | Apple states fingerprinting violates the rules even with consent banners. Enforcement is review rejection and, since 2024, required reason API reasons plus blocked tracking domains. |
Data you get
What comes back: Policy, not a data value
Shape: none
How often: static
No individual data fields. The signal is the access itself.
Technical limits
- Review rejection for SDKs that fingerprint
- NSPrivacyTrackingDomains blocked at the network layer when ATT is not granted (declared domains only)
- Enforcement is largely review time, not runtime
The story
What it is
Apple's rule that bans rebuilding a device ID from small clues after you say no to tracking.
For you
You do not see anything. It is a rule that says: if you tap 'Ask App Not to Track', the app may not secretly follow you anyway using your phone model, language and IP address.
For makers
Makers who use fingerprinting risk rejection. Apple enforces it at App Review and through required reason APIs, so ad networks moved to clearly permitted measures like SKAN.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| ads | An ad network that mixed IP and model to rebuild an ID could see its apps pulled. | Unity Ads |
| games | A game studio drops a probabilistic attribution tool to avoid a rejection. | Voodoo |
| analytics | A measurement firm limits itself to consented IDs and anonymous aggregates. | Adjust, AppsFlyer |
| security | Fraud teams may use signals to stop abuse, but not to track people for ads. | None named |
| shopping | A retailer is told to remove a script that built a device profile from signals. | None named |
| developer | A developer reads the guideline and rewrites its tracker to use only IDFV inside its own apps. | None named |
Risks
- Hard to detect
- Rule applies unevenly
Android and iPhone in short
- Android: Android has no equal rule, but Google Play bans abusive fingerprinting for ads on kids apps.
- iPhone: Applied mainly through App Review and the privacy manifest process.
What the platform says
- Apple: App Review Guidelines, Data use and sharing. Apps must not derive data from a device to identify a user who declined tracking.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Fraud prevention using non-identifying signals
Known abuse
- Re-identifying users who opted out
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 5 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 3 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 3 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | Not rated | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2020-12, iPhone iOS 14: Apple tells developers ATT cannot be bypassed by fingerprinting
- 2023-12, iPhone iOS 17: Required reason APIs announced to curb signals used for fingerprinting
- 2024-05, iPhone iOS 17.5: Required reason API reasons enforced for new uploads (1 May 2024)
Related capabilities
Related
- Device and SDK fingerprinting. Can guess who you are by combining small facts about your phone, with no prompt
- Required reason APIs. Can't use fingerprint prone phone details on iPhone without an approved reason
Same idea on the web
- Composite fingerprint (FingerprintJS, CreepJS). Can combine many device traits into one visitor ID that survives cleared cookies
Sources
- Apple: App Review Guidelines 5.1.2
- Apple News: Privacy updates for App Store submissions
- Apple: Describing use of required reason API
How well checked: Based on official documentation.