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Platform.Ontology

Composite fingerprint (FingerprintJS, CreepJS)

Combines dozens of signals into one visitor ID that survives cookie clearing.

Used to track youGraphics and fingerprintingCompositeWeb browsersWhen the page loadsWhile you use itAfter you leave the site

In one line

Can combine many device traits into one visitor ID that survives cleared cookies

Combines dozens of signals into one visitor ID that survives cookie clearing.

Open and commercial libraries hash 50 to 100 signals, then match drifting fingerprints to past visitors. Research found 90% of fingerprints are unique on desktop but breaking up over weeks, so linking needs ML.

What it can and can't do

What the user does: Nothing. It happens when the page loads, and again on each visit

It can

  • Collect about 50 to 100 small traits about your device and browser
  • Merge them into one visitor ID
  • Match your new profile to an old one when a few traits change
  • Link your visits across days without any cookie

It cannot

  • Be sure it is you, since many devices on desktop look alike or change after updates
  • See your name unless you log in
  • Match you well when Tor Browser or Brave hide or blur the traits
  • Ask your permission first

How it differs between platforms: Fingerprints work better on desktop. Phones of the same model look more alike, so they are harder to tell apart.

Browser support

BrowserStatusFirst versionReleasedNote
ChromeSupported12008-12-11None
EdgeSupported792020-01-15None
FirefoxSupported12004-11-09None
SafariSupported12003-06-23None
Safari on iPhoneSupported12007-06-29None
Chrome on AndroidSupported1Not listedNone
Samsung InternetSupported5.02016-12-15None

How a site asks for it

APIfingerprintjs.load().then(fp=>fp.get()); CreepJS
How access is grantednone
What the user seesNot listed
Needs a secure context (HTTPS)No
Needs a user gestureNo
How long it lastsNot listed
How to take it backNot listed
Inside an iframeNot listed

Typical flow

  1. Collect canvas, WebGL, audio, fonts, screen, timezone, hardware
  2. Hash components to visitorId
  3. Server matches new IDs to old ones with ML

Data you get

What comes back: 128-bit visitorId; open source version about 40 to 60 percent browser-ID accuracy per vendor claims, commercial claims 99.5%
Shape: hash

FieldTypeUnitRangePrecision
visitorIdhashbits128stable weeks to months

Technical limits

  • Mobile devices are far less unique than desktop
  • Shared enterprise images collide
  • Browser anti-fingerprint modes create noisy or common values

The story

What it is

A script combines dozens of small browser and device traits into one ID that survives cookie clearing.

For you

You see no sign of it. Your browser quietly answers dozens of small questions, and the combined answers are often unique enough to pick you out of millions of people.

For makers

Tools like FingerprintJS and CreepJS package this as a product. Sellers use it to stop fraud, fake accounts and refund abuse. It is also used to track people across sites when cookies are blocked.

Where you see it

TypeExampleApps
securityAn online bank uses a visitor ID to see that a login came from a device never seen with this customer.FingerprintJS
shoppingA retailer catches one person using many accounts to abuse a first order discount.None named
gamesA free to play browser game stops a banned cheater from simply opening a new account.None named
paymentsA checkout provider scores each order partly by how familiar the device is.Stripe Radar, Sift, Kount
adsAn ad network tries to link anonymous browsing across sites after the person clears cookies.None named
datingA dating site blocks scam accounts that keep coming back from the same laptop.None named
analyticsA research page, Cover Your Tracks, shows how unique your browser is so you can see what leaks.Cover Your Tracks (EFF), CreepJS

Risks

  • Hard to clear or reset
  • Used without clear consent
  • Can wrongly flag shared computers

Good uses and abuse

Legitimate uses

  • Fraud and account-takeover detection

Known abuse

  • Cross-site tracking when third-party script is on many sites

Scores

ScoreValueMeaning
Sensitivity4 of 5How revealing the data is
Utility2 of 5How useful it is to honest apps
Friction0 of 5How much the user has to do
Fingerprint bits8Rough identifying entropy, when known

A real example: LinkedIn

LinkedIn's script collects fingerprint signals; see research/linkedin-case.md

History

  • 2018-04, paper: Hiding in the Crowd: 33.6% of 2M fingerprints unique, mobile less
  • 2018-05, paper: FP-Stalker: fingerprints drift, linking gives average tracking duration up to 51.8 days
  • 2023-09, Safari 17: Private Browsing noise makes composite IDs unstable
  • 2025-09, Safari 26: Fingerprint protection default for known scripts

Sources

How well checked: Based on official documentation.

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