Hardware backed keys (Keystore and Secure Enclave)
Creates cryptographic keys that never leave the phone's secure chip.
In one line
Can make secret keys that stay locked inside your phone's security chip
Creates cryptographic keys that never leave the phone's secure chip.
A device-bound key proves that a request comes from one specific phone. The iOS Keychain can survive app deletion, which lets services recognise a returning device.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing, or you confirm with fingerprint or face when the app sets up secure sign in
It can
- Create a key in the phone's secure chip
- Sign data or log in with that key without exposing it
- Require your fingerprint or face each time the key is used
- Prove which phone model and security patch level it is on (Android)
It cannot
- Take the key out of the chip or copy it to a server
- Use the key after you remove the screen lock, when set to require one
- Use other key types in the iPhone Secure Enclave; it only supports P-256
- Move the key to a new phone
How it differs between platforms: Android can prove the model and patch level. iPhone Secure Enclave keys are limited to one key type and are checked by Face ID or Touch ID.
On Android and iPhone
| Android | iPhone | |
|---|---|---|
| Status | Supported | Supported |
| First version | Android 6.0 (API 23) | iOS 9.0 |
| Permission or entitlement | None | None |
| Protection level | none | none |
| How access is granted | none | none |
| What the user sees | Key is deleted on app uninstall; user auth binding optional | None |
| How long it lasts | Until uninstall | Keychain items can survive uninstall |
| How to take it back | Uninstall app; factory reset | Delete data via Settings; erase device |
| Store policy | None listed | None listed |
| API | KeyGenParameterSpec, StrongBox (API 28), setUserAuthenticationRequired, key attestation, Play Integrity | Keychain Services, kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave, SecAccessControl .biometryCurrentSet, App Attest |
| Notes | Hardware attestation certificates prove device model and OS patch level. | Items without a data protection class limit survive reinstall; Secure Enclave keys are only P-256. |
Data you get
What comes back: Key handle
Shape: object
How often: per use
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
key size | integer | bits | 256 (EC), 2048 or more (RSA) | exact |
Technical limits
- Key material is never extractable
The story
What it is
An app makes a secret key that is stored in a locked chip and never leaves your phone.
For you
You never see the key. What you notice is smooth, safe actions like approving a payment with a face scan, and a login that does not need a password. The secret stays on the phone.
For makers
Makers can prove that a login or payment came from one specific phone, which is strong protection against stolen passwords. The key can also tie an account to a device, and on iPhone some keychain items survive an uninstall, which helps services recognize a returning phone.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| banking | A bank signs each money transfer with a hardware key so a stolen password alone cannot move funds. | None named |
| payments | A wallet app approves a tap to pay with a key that only unlocks after you scan your face. | Apple Pay, Google Pay |
| games | A game uses a device key to sign purchase requests and block fake receipts. | None named |
| enterprise | A company ties staff logins to company phones with keys, so a copied password is useless on another device. | None named |
| security | A cryptocurrency app keeps its signing key inside the chip so malware cannot read it. | Coinbase Wallet |
| automotive | A digital car key stores a key in the chip so your phone can unlock and start the car. | BMW Digital Key |
Risks
- Reinstall linking on iPhone
- Key tied to one device
Android and iPhone in short
- Android: Android may keep keys in the main secure chip or a separate StrongBox chip, depending on the phone model.
- iPhone: iPhone keychain items can survive deleting an app, so a service may still recognise a returning phone.
What the platform says
- Google: Android Keystore. Keys live in protected hardware so even malware cannot copy them out of the phone.
- Apple: Secure Enclave. A separate chip that holds keys and checks Face ID or Touch ID without sharing them with the app.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Device bound login
- Payments
Known abuse
- Reinstall linking after uninstall (iOS Keychain)
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 3 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 5 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 3 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2015-09, iPhone iOS 9: Secure Enclave keys
- 2015-10, Android 6.0 (API 23): Android Keystore keys
- 2018-08, Android 9 (API 28): StrongBox Keymaster
Related capabilities
Related
- Biometric authentication. Can ask the phone to check your fingerprint or face, without seeing either
- Passkeys in an app (create and sign in). Can create and use passkeys inside the app after you approve with your device lock
Same idea on the web
- WebAuthn passkey registration. Can create a passkey or security key login for one site
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.