Biometric authentication
Lets the app ask the system to verify the user with fingerprint or face.
In one line
Can ask the phone to check your fingerprint or face, without seeing either
Lets the app ask the system to verify the user with fingerprint or face.
The app never sees the biometric; it gets a pass or fail. Face ID needs a purpose string.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: You tap Sign in, Approve payment, or Unlock and use your fingerprint or face
It can
- Show the system fingerprint or face prompt
- Learn a yes or no answer after the check
- Fall back to your PIN or passcode if you choose that
- Unlock a stored secret after a successful check
It cannot
- See your fingerprint, face map or the scan itself
- Run the check silently without showing the prompt
- Get a yes when the scan fails and you did not use your passcode
- Learn which finger or face matched
How it differs between platforms: iPhone needs a Face ID purpose message; Touch ID does not. Android shows a standard BiometricPrompt.
On Android and iPhone
| Android | iPhone | |
|---|---|---|
| Status | Supported | Supported |
| First version | Android 9 (API 28) | iOS 11 |
| Permission or entitlement | USE_BIOMETRIC | NSFaceIDUsageDescription |
| Protection level | normal | prompt |
| How access is granted | install | prompt |
| What the user sees | System BiometricPrompt | Face ID permission prompt on first use |
| How long it lasts | Per authentication | Until revoked |
| How to take it back | Biometric enrollment in Settings | Settings > Face ID & Passcode > Other apps |
| Store policy | Play: none | App Review 5.1.1 |
| API | BiometricPrompt, androidx.biometric | LocalAuthentication LAContext |
| Notes | USE_FINGERPRINT is deprecated. | Touch ID needs no purpose string; Face ID does. |
Data you get
What comes back: Authentication result
Shape: boolean
How often: per attempt
No individual data fields. The signal is the access itself.
Technical limits
- App cannot read biometric data
- App never receives the template
- Biometry changes can invalidate bound keys
- No raw biometric data crosses the app boundary
The story
What it is
An app asks the phone to confirm it is you using a face or fingerprint scan.
For you
You see a standard system prompt asking for your face or fingerprint. You scan and the app gets only yes or no. The app never sees your face or print.
For makers
Makers get strong proof that the right person is holding the phone, without storing biometric data. It speeds up logins and payments. It also lets them guard sensitive screens like balances or messages.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| banking | You open your bank app and unlock it with Face ID instead of typing a 6 digit code. | None named |
| payments | You approve a payment in a shop or delivery app with one fingerprint touch. | Venmo, Cash App |
| productivity | Your notes app locks private notes and opens them with your face. | Apple Notes |
| messaging | A secure chat app asks for biometrics when you open it, so a borrowed phone cannot read your chats. | Signal |
| games | A game store asks for a fingerprint before it confirms a purchase, which protects kids' accounts. | None named |
| health | A health app protects test results behind a scan. | None named |
Risks
- Face unlock may be forced by others
- Fallback code is weaker
Android and iPhone in short
- Android: Android offers weak and strong biometrics, and apps pick which level they need.
- iPhone: iPhone requires a short purpose text for Face ID so the app can say why it asks.
What the platform says
- Apple: Face ID and Touch ID. Unlock, sign in and pay securely with your face or fingerprint.
- Google: Biometric authentication. Android shows a standard prompt so apps can use fingerprint or face to confirm you.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Login
- Payment approval
Known abuse
- None specific
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 2 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 4 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 1 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | Not rated | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2014-09, iPhone iOS 8: Touch ID LocalAuthentication
- 2017-09, iPhone iOS 11: Face ID introduced
- 2017-09, iPhone iOS 11: Face ID launched; NSFaceIDUsageDescription required
- 2017-09, iPhone iOS 11: Face ID
- 2018-08, Android 9 (API 28): BiometricPrompt introduced
- 2018-08, Android 9 (API 28): BiometricPrompt replaces FingerprintManager
- 2018-08, Android 9.0 (API 28): BiometricPrompt unified API
- 2019-10, Android 10 (API 29): Biometric classes and BiometricManager
Related capabilities
Related
- App Attest and Play Integrity. Can prove its requests come from the real app on a genuine phone
- Hardware backed keys (Keystore and Secure Enclave). Can make secret keys that stay locked inside your phone's security chip
- Passkeys in an app (create and sign in). Can create and use passkeys inside the app after you approve with your device lock
Same idea on the web
- WebAuthn passkey registration. Can create a passkey or security key login for one site
- WebAuthn sign in (get) and conditional mediation. Can sign you in with a passkey, even from the username box suggestions
Sources
- Android: Biometric authentication
- Apple: LocalAuthentication
- Apple: Logging a user into your app with Face ID or Touch ID
- Apple: Protected resources keys
How well checked: Based on official documentation.