HUMAN Security (PerimeterX) hidden iframe
A hidden iframe from li.protechts.net runs HUMAN's bot detection with a hash of LinkedIn's browser ID.
In one line
Can run a hidden bot check on LinkedIn pages and tie it to its browser ID
A hidden iframe from li.protechts.net runs HUMAN's bot detection with a hash of LinkedIn's browser ID.
A third-party vendor runs its own behavior and device checks in the page and sets its own cookies, tied to the person through a hash of LinkedIn's bcookie.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. It happens when a LinkedIn page loads
It can
- Load a hidden frame from a security company during the page visit
- Score whether you look like a person or a bot
- Send a scrambled version of LinkedIn's browser ID with the check
It cannot
- Show you anything, since the frame is hidden
- See your files, other tabs or other apps
- Run if the page or its frames are blocked, though blocking may break the page
- Name you on its own without the LinkedIn ID
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | Not available | None |
| Edge | Supported | Not available | None |
| Firefox | Supported | Not available | None |
| Safari | Supported | Not available | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | Not available | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | Not available | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | Not available | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | iframe https://li.protechts.net/index.html?ts=<ms>&r_id=<treeId>&app_id=PXdOjV695v&uc=scraping&d_id=<SHA256(bcookie)> |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | None (no browser prompt) |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Cookies _pxvid, _pxmvid, _pxhd, _pxde, pxcts, _px<id>, _pxff_<id>, _pxttld per LinkedIn cookie table |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- LIX flag pemberly.tracking.human.integration loads the iframe (id humanThirdPartyIframe)
- HUMAN script collects its own device and behavior signals
- Cookies set under LinkedIn's domain for risk scoring
- d_id is SHA256 of bcookie so HUMAN can join its data to LinkedIn's browser ID
Data you get
What comes back: Vendor risk telemetry
Shape: object
How often: continuous
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
d_id | hash | SHA256 | 64 hex | stable per bcookie |
app_id | string | None | PXdOjV695v (prod), PXgoH0hfKu (non prod) | fixed |
Technical limits
- Exact HUMAN signal set is not published
- BleepingComputer could not verify further sharing beyond the iframe
The story
What it is
A hidden frame from a security firm runs bot checks on the page and sets its own cookies.
For you
You never see this hidden frame. It runs checks on how your device and mouse behave, and sets its own cookie. The security firm links its data to you through a code made from LinkedIn's browser ID.
For makers
Bots cost LinkedIn real money and trust, so it hires a specialist to spot them. The vendor learns patterns across many sites, and that sharpens the score. A critic notes the vendor also gets a link to a person.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| security | A script posing as a person tries to log in thousands of times, and the bot checks give each try a risk score. | HUMAN Security, LinkedIn |
| games | A bot solves LinkedIn Games puzzles at superhuman speed to climb a leaderboard, and the checks help catch it. | LinkedIn Games |
| ads | A bot clicks a paid ad over and over, and the checks mark those clicks invalid so the advertiser is not billed. | LinkedIn Ads |
| social | A fake account sends spam invites, and the checks notice the browser does not behave like a human one. | |
| shopping | Ticket and sneaker sites use the same kind of check to block bots that buy stock before people can. | Ticketmaster, Nike |
| analytics | A team removes bot traffic from its reports so real person numbers are accurate. | Adobe Analytics |
Risks
- Third party sees device and behavior data
- Tied to your LinkedIn ID by a hash
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Stop scrapers and credential stuffing
Known abuse
- Third party gets a browser keyed identifier
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 3 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 2 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 10 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
A real example: LinkedIn
Verified in the snapshot (iframe URL, app ids, id humanThirdPartyIframe). LinkedIn's cookie table lists the _px cookies. What HUMAN collects inside is not documented publicly.
Related capabilities
Related
- LinkedIn anti-abuse cookies (li_bapfcc, li_odapfcc, li_apfcdc, spectroscopyId, fid, fcookie). Can check your browser for bots and add a device fingerprint to your visit
- APFC / DNA device fingerprint (abuse prevention features). Can collect about 48 device traits and send them in secret with later requests
Sources
- mdp/linkedin-extension-fingerprinting (LinkedIn script snapshot and ID list)
- LinkedIn cookie table
- BleepingComputer: LinkedIn scans for 6,000+ Chrome extensions
How well checked: Checked against real behavior.