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Platform.Ontology

HUMAN Security (PerimeterX) hidden iframe

A hidden iframe from li.protechts.net runs HUMAN's bot detection with a hash of LinkedIn's browser ID.

Used to track youTracking across apps and sitesAnti-abuse vendorsWeb browsersWhen the page loadsWhile you use itWhen you are signed in

In one line

Can run a hidden bot check on LinkedIn pages and tie it to its browser ID

A hidden iframe from li.protechts.net runs HUMAN's bot detection with a hash of LinkedIn's browser ID.

A third-party vendor runs its own behavior and device checks in the page and sets its own cookies, tied to the person through a hash of LinkedIn's bcookie.

What it can and can't do

What the user does: Nothing. It happens when a LinkedIn page loads

It can

  • Load a hidden frame from a security company during the page visit
  • Score whether you look like a person or a bot
  • Send a scrambled version of LinkedIn's browser ID with the check

It cannot

  • Show you anything, since the frame is hidden
  • See your files, other tabs or other apps
  • Run if the page or its frames are blocked, though blocking may break the page
  • Name you on its own without the LinkedIn ID

Browser support

BrowserStatusFirst versionNote
ChromeSupportedNot availableNone
EdgeSupportedNot availableNone
FirefoxSupportedNot availableNone
SafariSupportedNot availableNone
Safari on iPhoneSupportedNot availableNone
Chrome on AndroidSupportedNot availableNone
Samsung InternetSupportedNot availableNone

How a site asks for it

APIiframe https://li.protechts.net/index.html?ts=<ms>&r_id=<treeId>&app_id=PXdOjV695v&uc=scraping&d_id=<SHA256(bcookie)>
How access is grantednone
What the user seesNone (no browser prompt)
Needs a secure context (HTTPS)No
Needs a user gestureNo
How long it lastsCookies _pxvid, _pxmvid, _pxhd, _pxde, pxcts, _px<id>, _pxff_<id>, _pxttld per LinkedIn cookie table
How to take it backNot listed
Inside an iframeNot listed

Typical flow

  1. LIX flag pemberly.tracking.human.integration loads the iframe (id humanThirdPartyIframe)
  2. HUMAN script collects its own device and behavior signals
  3. Cookies set under LinkedIn's domain for risk scoring
  4. d_id is SHA256 of bcookie so HUMAN can join its data to LinkedIn's browser ID

Data you get

What comes back: Vendor risk telemetry
Shape: object
How often: continuous

FieldTypeUnitRangePrecision
d_idhashSHA25664 hexstable per bcookie
app_idstringNonePXdOjV695v (prod), PXgoH0hfKu (non prod)fixed

Technical limits

  • Exact HUMAN signal set is not published
  • BleepingComputer could not verify further sharing beyond the iframe

The story

What it is

A hidden frame from a security firm runs bot checks on the page and sets its own cookies.

For you

You never see this hidden frame. It runs checks on how your device and mouse behave, and sets its own cookie. The security firm links its data to you through a code made from LinkedIn's browser ID.

For makers

Bots cost LinkedIn real money and trust, so it hires a specialist to spot them. The vendor learns patterns across many sites, and that sharpens the score. A critic notes the vendor also gets a link to a person.

Where you see it

TypeExampleApps
securityA script posing as a person tries to log in thousands of times, and the bot checks give each try a risk score.HUMAN Security, LinkedIn
gamesA bot solves LinkedIn Games puzzles at superhuman speed to climb a leaderboard, and the checks help catch it.LinkedIn Games
adsA bot clicks a paid ad over and over, and the checks mark those clicks invalid so the advertiser is not billed.LinkedIn Ads
socialA fake account sends spam invites, and the checks notice the browser does not behave like a human one.LinkedIn
shoppingTicket and sneaker sites use the same kind of check to block bots that buy stock before people can.Ticketmaster, Nike
analyticsA team removes bot traffic from its reports so real person numbers are accurate.Adobe Analytics

Risks

  • Third party sees device and behavior data
  • Tied to your LinkedIn ID by a hash

Good uses and abuse

Legitimate uses

  • Stop scrapers and credential stuffing

Known abuse

  • Third party gets a browser keyed identifier

Scores

ScoreValueMeaning
Sensitivity3 of 5How revealing the data is
Utility2 of 5How useful it is to honest apps
Friction0 of 5How much the user has to do
Fingerprint bits10Rough identifying entropy, when known

A real example: LinkedIn

Verified in the snapshot (iframe URL, app ids, id humanThirdPartyIframe). LinkedIn's cookie table lists the _px cookies. What HUMAN collects inside is not documented publicly.

Sources

How well checked: Checked against real behavior.

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