APFC / DNA device fingerprint (abuse prevention features)
Collects about 48 device and browser traits, encrypts them, and attaches them to later requests.
In one line
Can collect about 48 device traits and send them in secret with later requests
Collects about 48 device and browser traits, encrypts them, and attaches them to later requests.
Builds a device fingerprint from hardware, display, locale, rendering and storage traits. Because it is encrypted with a LinkedIn key and sent as a header, people and researchers cannot easily see what leaves the browser.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. It happens when a LinkedIn page loads
It can
- Collect about 48 traits about your hardware, screen, language, drawing and storage
- Lock the result with a LinkedIn key
- Attach it to later requests as a header, so it is hard to see
- Link your visits to one device profile
It cannot
- Ask permission first
- Be seen or checked by you in plain form
- See your files or private messages
- Be cleared by deleting cookies alone
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | Not available | None |
| Edge | Supported | Not available | None |
| Firefox | Supported | Not available | None |
| Safari | Supported | Not available | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | Not available | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | Not available | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | Not available | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | Fingerprint2.js derived collector; RSA encrypt (key apfcDfPK); compressToBase64; globalThis.apfcDf; header on API calls; /platform-telemetry/li/apfcDf, /apfc/collect |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | None (no browser prompt) |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Cookies li_bapfcc and li_odapfcc 2 years (control how many features are collected); li_apfcdc 10 hours (triggering) |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- Collector gathers about 47 keyed features plus the getFeatures meta item (48 in BrowserGate's count)
- Each feature has a dataLimit (e.g. webgl 6, fonts 1500, userAgent 1500)
- Result is RSA encrypted with a key delivered from apfcDfPK, compressed and stored in globalThis.apfcDf
- Attached as an HTTP header to later API requests (LIX flag sync.apfc.headers) and posted to telemetry endpoints
- Server side flags (pemberly.tracking.fireApfcEvent, pemberly.tracking.apfc.network.interceptor) switch it on
Data you get
What comes back: Encrypted blob of about 48 features
Shape: object
How often: per page or session
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
features | object | features | 47 keys plus getFeatures | names verified in public script snapshot |
apfcDf | binary | bytes | unknown (encrypted, compressed) | opaque to the user |
Technical limits
- Cannot be decrypted by the page or user (private key is server side)
- Feature count and set may change between releases
- Public snapshot may differ from production
The story
What it is
LinkedIn's abuse prevention code collects around 48 device and browser traits, encrypts them and sends them with later requests.
For you
You never see it. When you use a site that loads this code, your browser quietly collects about 48 traits and sends them in an encrypted bundle. It is meant to catch fake accounts and scrapers.
For makers
LinkedIn says this is for abuse prevention. Fraud teams use it to spot fake accounts and scraping at scale. Privacy researchers point out that the same data can also work as a durable device ID.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| social | A professional network blocks a scraper that creates thousands of fake profiles to collect names and job titles. | |
| security | A site compares your device bundle with past logins and asks for a code if it looks new. | None named |
| ads | An ad system could use a similar bundle to recognize a device, which is why privacy groups watch it. | None named |
| dating | A dating app uses a device bundle to ban scammers who keep making new profiles. | None named |
| shopping | A marketplace spots one person running hundreds of seller accounts from the same laptop. | None named |
| banking | A bank adds a device trait bundle to its risk score at login. | None named |
| analytics | A research team compares the traits collected and shows which are most unique. | None named |
Risks
- Hard to opt out
- Encrypted so hard to inspect
- Doubles as a device ID
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Bot and fake account detection
- Account takeover defense
Known abuse
- Cross-session device identification
- Profiling beyond security needs
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 4 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 3 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 30 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
A real example: LinkedIn
Core fingerprint stack. The 47 collector keys plus getFeatures give the 48 named by BrowserGate. Names verified in the public mdp snapshot; the count and that production matches today are from BrowserGate and not independently confirmed.
Related capabilities
Related
- LinkedIn anti-abuse cookies (li_bapfcc, li_odapfcc, li_apfcdc, spectroscopyId, fid, fcookie). Can check your browser for bots and add a device fingerprint to your visit
- Spoofing and lie detection (signals). Can check whether your browser settings were faked or an ad blocker is on
- Canvas fingerprint. Can draw a hidden picture and use tiny pixel differences to tell devices apart
- WebGL renderer and parameters. Can see your graphics card name and its capability limits
- Audio fingerprint (OfflineAudioContext). Can make a silent test sound to tell your device apart from others
Sources
- mdp/linkedin-extension-fingerprinting (LinkedIn script snapshot and ID list)
- BrowserGate: how it works (48 feature table)
- LinkedIn cookie table
- BleepingComputer: LinkedIn scans for 6,000+ Chrome extensions
- The Next Web: BrowserGate
How well checked: Checked against real behavior.