LinkedIn anti-abuse cookies (li_bapfcc, li_odapfcc, li_apfcdc, spectroscopyId, fid, fcookie)
Cookies that control and carry the fingerprint and extension scans, disclosed in LinkedIn's own table.
In one line
Can check your browser for bots and add a device fingerprint to your visit
Cookies that control and carry the fingerprint and extension scans, disclosed in LinkedIn's own table.
First party confirmation that LinkedIn collects 'abuse prevention features' from the member's device and checks for extensions. The Cookie Policy text itself does not mention fingerprinting or extensions.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. It happens when a LinkedIn page loads
It can
- Store small markers in your browser for bot and abuse checks
- Carry a device fingerprint with your visits
- Record the result of extension scans LinkedIn discloses in its cookie table
It cannot
- Work if you clear the cookies, though a fingerprint may rebuild
- Name you without a LinkedIn login
- See other tabs or your files
- Be turned off with the normal cookie banner for essential security
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | Not available | None |
| Edge | Supported | Not available | None |
| Firefox | Supported | Not available | None |
| Safari | Supported | Not available | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | Not available | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | Not available | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | Not available | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | Set-Cookie li_bapfcc, li_odapfcc, li_apfcdc, spectroscopyId, fid, fcookie, ccookie, rtc, trkInfo, trkCode, chp_token, li_cu, f_token, denial-* |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | None (no browser prompt) |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | li_bapfcc and li_odapfcc 2 years; li_apfcdc 10 hours; spectroscopyId session |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- Server sets li_bapfcc to cap how many features the script collects
- li_apfcdc triggers collection
- spectroscopyId marks an extension scan session
Data you get
What comes back: Control flags
Shape: string
How often: per session
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
li_bapfcc | string | None | number of features | 2 years |
Technical limits
- Cookie names show intent but not exact payloads
The story
What it is
Cookies tied to LinkedIn's checks on your device and browser extensions, listed in its own cookie table.
For you
You never see these cookies or the checks behind them. LinkedIn's own cookie table says they support abuse prevention. A public analysis says the related scripts look at the browser and add ons on your device.
For makers
Fake accounts and scrapers are a big cost for a social site. Scanning for browser extensions and device traits helps LinkedIn tell bots from people. The same data can act as a device fingerprint, so critics ask whether it is used for more than safety.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| security | LinkedIn spots a browser running a scraping extension that copies profiles in bulk, and limits the account. | |
| security | A fake recruiter account logs in from a browser with signs of automation, so LinkedIn asks for a puzzle or blocks it. | |
| social | You log in from a new laptop. The device checks run in the background and decide whether to ask you for a code. | |
| ads | Ad fraud teams use device traits to throw out fake clicks, so advertisers do not pay for bots. | LinkedIn Ads |
| analytics | A growth team counts real people, not bots, by filtering sessions that the checks flag. | |
| games | LinkedIn Games such as Queens and Tango could see bots solve a puzzle in a second, and the checks help flag that. | LinkedIn Games |
Risks
- Device scans are not described in the policy text
- Could work as a fingerprint
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Abuse prevention
Known abuse
- Persistent device identifiers
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 4 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 3 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | Not rated | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
A real example: LinkedIn
LinkedIn's cookie table describes li_bapfcc and li_odapfcc as controlling the number of abuse prevention features collected from the member's device, li_apfcdc as triggering them, spectroscopyId as catching malicious activity through browser extensions.
Related capabilities
Related
- APFC / DNA device fingerprint (abuse prevention features). Can collect about 48 device traits and send them in secret with later requests
- Active extension probe (AED). Can check which of thousands of known browser extensions you have installed
- HUMAN Security (PerimeterX) hidden iframe. Can run a hidden bot check on LinkedIn pages and tie it to its browser ID
Sources
How well checked: Checked against real behavior.