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Platform.Ontology

LinkedIn anti-abuse cookies (li_bapfcc, li_odapfcc, li_apfcdc, spectroscopyId, fid, fcookie)

Cookies that control and carry the fingerprint and extension scans, disclosed in LinkedIn's own table.

Used to track youTracking across apps and sitesCookiesWeb browsersWhen the page loadsWhile you use itWhen you are signed in

In one line

Can check your browser for bots and add a device fingerprint to your visit

Cookies that control and carry the fingerprint and extension scans, disclosed in LinkedIn's own table.

First party confirmation that LinkedIn collects 'abuse prevention features' from the member's device and checks for extensions. The Cookie Policy text itself does not mention fingerprinting or extensions.

What it can and can't do

What the user does: Nothing. It happens when a LinkedIn page loads

It can

  • Store small markers in your browser for bot and abuse checks
  • Carry a device fingerprint with your visits
  • Record the result of extension scans LinkedIn discloses in its cookie table

It cannot

  • Work if you clear the cookies, though a fingerprint may rebuild
  • Name you without a LinkedIn login
  • See other tabs or your files
  • Be turned off with the normal cookie banner for essential security

Browser support

BrowserStatusFirst versionNote
ChromeSupportedNot availableNone
EdgeSupportedNot availableNone
FirefoxSupportedNot availableNone
SafariSupportedNot availableNone
Safari on iPhoneSupportedNot availableNone
Chrome on AndroidSupportedNot availableNone
Samsung InternetSupportedNot availableNone

How a site asks for it

APISet-Cookie li_bapfcc, li_odapfcc, li_apfcdc, spectroscopyId, fid, fcookie, ccookie, rtc, trkInfo, trkCode, chp_token, li_cu, f_token, denial-*
How access is grantednone
What the user seesNone (no browser prompt)
Needs a secure context (HTTPS)No
Needs a user gestureNo
How long it lastsli_bapfcc and li_odapfcc 2 years; li_apfcdc 10 hours; spectroscopyId session
How to take it backNot listed
Inside an iframeNot listed

Typical flow

  1. Server sets li_bapfcc to cap how many features the script collects
  2. li_apfcdc triggers collection
  3. spectroscopyId marks an extension scan session

Data you get

What comes back: Control flags
Shape: string
How often: per session

FieldTypeUnitRangePrecision
li_bapfccstringNonenumber of features2 years

Technical limits

  • Cookie names show intent but not exact payloads

The story

What it is

Cookies tied to LinkedIn's checks on your device and browser extensions, listed in its own cookie table.

For you

You never see these cookies or the checks behind them. LinkedIn's own cookie table says they support abuse prevention. A public analysis says the related scripts look at the browser and add ons on your device.

For makers

Fake accounts and scrapers are a big cost for a social site. Scanning for browser extensions and device traits helps LinkedIn tell bots from people. The same data can act as a device fingerprint, so critics ask whether it is used for more than safety.

Where you see it

TypeExampleApps
securityLinkedIn spots a browser running a scraping extension that copies profiles in bulk, and limits the account.LinkedIn
securityA fake recruiter account logs in from a browser with signs of automation, so LinkedIn asks for a puzzle or blocks it.LinkedIn
socialYou log in from a new laptop. The device checks run in the background and decide whether to ask you for a code.LinkedIn
adsAd fraud teams use device traits to throw out fake clicks, so advertisers do not pay for bots.LinkedIn Ads
analyticsA growth team counts real people, not bots, by filtering sessions that the checks flag.LinkedIn
gamesLinkedIn Games such as Queens and Tango could see bots solve a puzzle in a second, and the checks help flag that.LinkedIn Games

Risks

  • Device scans are not described in the policy text
  • Could work as a fingerprint

Good uses and abuse

Legitimate uses

  • Abuse prevention

Known abuse

  • Persistent device identifiers

Scores

ScoreValueMeaning
Sensitivity4 of 5How revealing the data is
Utility3 of 5How useful it is to honest apps
Friction0 of 5How much the user has to do
Fingerprint bitsNot ratedRough identifying entropy, when known

A real example: LinkedIn

LinkedIn's cookie table describes li_bapfcc and li_odapfcc as controlling the number of abuse prevention features collected from the member's device, li_apfcdc as triggering them, spectroscopyId as catching malicious activity through browser extensions.

Sources

How well checked: Checked against real behavior.

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