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Platform.Ontology

Merchant Pool device fingerprint script (Microsoft DFP)

Loads mdt.js from merchantpool1.linkedin.com and runs a device fingerprint call.

Used to track youTracking across apps and sitesAnti-abuse vendorsWeb browsersWhen the page loadsWhile you use it

In one line

Can collect device traits from a Microsoft fingerprint script on LinkedIn pages

Loads mdt.js from merchantpool1.linkedin.com and runs a device fingerprint call.

A second device fingerprinting layer, apparently Microsoft's fraud protection technology (inferred from cookie names and a doFpt call), keyed to LinkedIn's browser ID.

What it can and can't do

What the user does: Nothing. It happens when a LinkedIn page loads the script

It can

  • Load a script from a LinkedIn payments host
  • Collect traits like screen size, fonts and browser settings for a device fingerprint
  • Send those traits to Microsoft for fraud checks

It cannot

  • Show you anything on the page
  • See your files, other tabs or other apps
  • Run if the script is blocked
  • Name you without a login

Browser support

Chromeworks
Edgeworks
Firefoxworks
Safariworks
iPhoneworks
Androidworks
Samsungworks
BrowserStatusFirst versionNote
ChromeSupportedNot availableNone
EdgeSupportedNot availableNone
FirefoxSupportedNot availableNone
SafariSupportedNot availableNone
Safari on iPhoneSupportedNot availableNone
Chrome on AndroidSupportedNot availableNone
Samsung InternetSupportedNot availableNone

How a site asks for it

APIscript https://merchantpool1.linkedin.com/mdt.js?session_id=<bcookie>&instanceId=<uuid>; window.dfp.doFpt(document)
How access is grantednone
What the user seesNone (no browser prompt)
Needs a secure context (HTTPS)No
Needs a user gestureNo
How long it lastsCookie dfpfpt per LinkedIn table; Microsoft fptctx2 inferred
How to take it backNot listed
Inside an iframeNot listed

Typical flow

  1. LIX flag pemberly.tracking.dfp.integration enables the load
  2. mdt.js is requested with session_id set to bcookie and a fixed instanceId (prod fb6bbd47-fa7c-4264-b4e9-b25948407586)
  3. Script calls window.dfp.doFpt(document)

Data you get

What comes back: Vendor fingerprint
Shape: object
How often: per page

FieldTypeUnitRangePrecision
session_idstringbcookieNot listedstable per browser

Technical limits

  • Link to Microsoft Dynamics 365 Fraud Protection is inferred, not stated by LinkedIn
  • What mdt.js collects was not deobfuscated in this research

The story

What it is

A script from a LinkedIn server runs a device fingerprint check tied to your browser ID.

For you

You never see it. A script collects clues about your device, such as screen and software traits, to build a fingerprint. Public analysis suggests it comes from Microsoft's fraud tools.

For makers

A device fingerprint lets a platform tell if the same device creates many fake accounts or ads. It works even when cookies are cleared. The same trick can also track a person across visits, which is why privacy groups push back.

Where you see it

TypeExampleApps
securityA fraudster opens twenty fake ad accounts from one laptop. The fingerprint links them as one device.LinkedIn Ads
paymentsA stolen card is used to buy ads, and the fingerprint helps spot the device behind many cards.LinkedIn Ads
socialA banned account owner comes back with a new email, and the device fingerprint links the new account to the old one.LinkedIn
gamesA person makes many accounts to cheat on a game leaderboard, and a fingerprint can reveal one device behind them.LinkedIn Games
adsAd review teams use the fingerprint to remove clicks from the same device that clicks the same ad hundreds of times.LinkedIn Ads
analyticsAn analytics team counts unique devices rather than cookies, which stays steady after people clear cookies.None named

Risks

  • Works without cookies
  • Cannot be easily reset by you

Good uses and abuse

Legitimate uses

  • Payment and account fraud screening

Known abuse

  • Persistent identification

Scores

ScoreValueMeaning
Sensitivity3 of 5How revealing the data is
Utility2 of 5How useful it is to honest apps
Friction0 of 5How much the user has to do
Fingerprint bits15Rough identifying entropy, when known

A real example: LinkedIn

URL, instance id and doFpt call seen in the snapshot; the Microsoft DFP product link is an inference from names.

Sources

How well checked: Inferred from related behavior.

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