ECH and DoH visibility
Encrypted Client Hello and DNS over HTTPS hide which site a visitor connects to from the local network.
In one line
Can hide the site you visit from your internet provider, not from the site itself
Encrypted Client Hello and DNS over HTTPS hide which site a visitor connects to from the local network.
ECH encrypts the SNI and the rest of the ClientHello using a key from DNS HTTPS records (RFC 9849 in Chrome 117 and Firefox 118 era). DoH encrypts DNS lookups. They hide hostnames from ISPs but not from the site, and they weaken JA3/JA4 on the wire.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. Your browser can turn it on by itself, or you choose it in settings
It can
- Hide the site name from your internet provider on supported sites
- Hide your DNS lookups from your network with secure DNS
- Keep working on supported sites without changing how pages look
It cannot
- Hide you from the site you visit; it still sees you connect
- Work in Safari today
- Work with some network filters and monitors, which may break or block it
How it differs between platforms: Chrome, Edge, Firefox and Samsung Internet support it. Safari does not yet.
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | 117 | 2023-09-12 | None |
| Edge | Supported | 117 | 2023-09-15 | None |
| Firefox | Supported | 118 | 2023-09-26 | None |
| Safari | Not supported | Not available | Not listed | :No ECH support known at 2026-11 (unverified) |
| Safari on iPhone | Not supported | Not available | Not listed | :No ECH support known at 2026-11 (unverified) |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | 117 | 2023-09-12 | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | 24.0 | 2024-01-25 | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | TLS ECH extension; HTTPS RR; DoH |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | Not listed |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Not listed |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- Resolver returns ECH config
- Browser sends encrypted inner ClientHello
- Network sees only a public name
Data you get
What comes back: ECH accepted
Shape: boolean
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ech_accepted | boolean | None | true or false | per connection |
Technical limits
- Needs an ECH enabled CDN (Cloudflare) and DoH
- Outer SNI still visible as a shared public name
The story
What it is
Hides which site you connect to from people watching your network.
For you
You see nothing change. On public Wi-Fi or at a school, the network can no longer easily see which site you are opening. Your home network or work can still see that you connected.
For makers
Makers get stronger privacy for visitors and fewer blocked connections. Network filters, schools and countries lose an easy way to block sites by name. Some security tools also lose visibility.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| media | A news site in a country with censorship becomes harder for the network to block by name. | None named |
| games | A gamer on school or hotel Wi-Fi opens a game site that the network blocks by name, and it still loads. | None named |
| security | A company security tool loses sight of which sites staff open, so it uses managed browsers instead. | None named |
| shopping | A shopper on cafe Wi-Fi hides which stores they visit from nearby snoopers. | None named |
| ads | Internet providers lose a data source used to sell browsing history to marketers. | None named |
| analytics | A researcher measures how much web traffic hides its destination. | Cloudflare Radar |
Risks
- Hides sites from parental filters
- Harder for security teams
What the platform says
- Cloudflare: Encrypted Client Hello. Cloudflare pitches it as the missing piece that hides which website you visit from anyone watching the connection.
- Mozilla: DNS over HTTPS. Mozilla describes DNS over HTTPS as a way to encrypt website lookups so others on the network cannot see them.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Censorship resistance, privacy
Known abuse
- Makes middlebox TLS fingerprinting harder
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 1 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 3 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 1 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2023-09, Chrome 117: ECH enabled by default
- 2023-09, Firefox 118: ECH enabled by default (DoH required)
Related capabilities
Related
- DNS resolver leak test. Can find which DNS service your device uses by having it look up odd names
- JA4+ network fingerprint family. Can recognize your browser or app from several quiet network clues, even when shuffled
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.