WebRTC ICE host candidates (mDNS)
WebRTC used to expose the device's local network IP; browsers now hide it behind a random .local name.
In one line
Can try to find your device's home network address, but browsers now hide it
WebRTC used to expose the device's local network IP; browsers now hide it behind a random .local name.
RTCPeerConnection gathers ICE host candidates. Since 2019 and 2020 Chrome and Firefox replace private IPs with mDNS .local names, but granting getUserMedia (camera or microphone) restores real addresses.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: You join a video call or visit a site that sets up a call connection
It can
- Start a call connection that lists your device's network addresses
- See a random .local name in place of your real home network address in Chrome and Firefox
- See your real home network address if you have also allowed camera or microphone
It cannot
- See your real home network address by default in Chrome and Firefox since 2019 and 2020
- Set this up without a site script running
- See other devices on your network from this alone
- Be sure to bypass a VPN, since modern browsers mask the address
How it differs between platforms: Chrome and Firefox hide the address by default. Safari asks differently and also shows a masked name unless camera or microphone is allowed.
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | 56 | 2017-01-25 | mDNS default since 75 |
| Edge | Supported | 15 | 2017-04-05 | mDNS default since 75 |
| Firefox | Supported | 44 | 2016-01-26 | mDNS default desktop since 78 |
| Safari | Supported | 11 | 2017-09-19 | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | 11 | 2017-09-19 | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | 56 | 2017-02-01 | mDNS default since 75 |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | 6.0 | 2017-08-23 | mDNS default since 75 |
How a site asks for it
| API | RTCPeerConnection.onicecandidate; media.peerconnection.ice.obfuscate_host_addresses |
| Browser compat keys | api.RTCPeerConnection |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | Not listed |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Not listed |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- Create RTCPeerConnection and data channel
- Read candidate strings
- Parse IP or mDNS name
Data you get
What comes back: ICE candidate strings
Shape: list
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
host candidate | string | None | private IPv4 or mDNS UUID.local | hidden by default in modern browsers |
Technical limits
- getUserMedia permission re-exposes local IPs
- Still leaks IPv6 addresses in some cases
The story
What it is
Video call tech used to show your device's home network address. Browsers now hide it behind a random name.
For you
On a video call or a multiplayer game you notice nothing. Behind the scenes your browser offers a random name instead of your home network address. Calls still work.
For makers
Makers need these candidate addresses to link two devices directly, which cuts server cost and delay. Hiding the real address stops sites from quietly reading it, but direct links on the same network still work.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| video | Two coworkers on the same office Wi-Fi join a Google Meet call. Their browsers swap random local names and connect straight to each other, which keeps audio crisp. | Google Meet |
| games | A browser party game uses peer to peer data channels. Players on the same Wi-Fi link directly through hidden local names, so moves arrive with low delay. | None named |
| video | A cloud gaming stream in a browser sets up a direct media path from the game server to the player. Hidden local names stop the page leaking the player's network layout. | GeForce NOW, Xbox Cloud Gaming |
| social | A web chat app starts a voice room. Friends on one network connect with each other without sending audio through the company's servers. | Discord |
| ads | A tracking script used to read local addresses to tell devices apart. With hidden names it gets a random value that changes, so that trick stops working. | None named |
| enterprise | A telehealth site lets a doctor and patient talk. It keeps the call direct when possible and avoids storing home addresses in logs. | None named |
| education | A virtual classroom opens small group rooms. Students in the same school building connect over the local network, so lessons run smoothly. | None named |
Risks
- Older browsers leak addresses
- Hidden names add setup steps
What the platform says
- IETF: mDNS ICE candidates. Browsers swap your local address for a random .local name, so calls still connect but the real address stays private.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Peer to peer calls
Known abuse
- VPN bypass detection and local IP leak, LAN inventory
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 2 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 3 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 3 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2018-01, Chrome: WebRTC leak popularized by VPN leak tests
- 2019-06, Chrome 75: mDNS host candidates by default
- 2020-06, Firefox 78: mDNS host candidates by default on desktop
Related capabilities
Related
- WebRTC STUN public IP discovery. Can find the public internet address of your real connection, even when some VPNs hide it
- VPN, proxy and Tor detection. Can guess whether you are hiding behind a VPN, proxy or Tor, but not always correctly
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.