JA3 TLS client fingerprint
The TLS handshake order of ciphers and extensions identifies the client software.
In one line
Can guess which browser or app you use from how your connection starts
The TLS handshake order of ciphers and extensions identifies the client software.
JA3 (Salesforce, 2017) is an MD5 of version, ciphers, extensions, curves and point formats in the ClientHello. Chrome 110 randomized extension order (Jan 2023), so one browser now yields many JA3s; JA4 sorts them out.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. It happens the moment your browser connects to the site
It can
- Make a short code from the list of options your browser offers when it connects
- Spot bots, scripts and malware that connect differently from real browsers
- Recognize the same software again across different internet addresses
It cannot
- See your name, account or what you browse
- Give one steady code for Chrome, since Chrome shuffles the order and gives many codes
- Be turned off in your browser settings
- Tell two people with identical software apart
How it differs between platforms: Chrome and Edge shuffle the options on purpose, so one browser gives many codes. Firefox and Safari keep a steadier order.
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | 1 | 2008-12-11 | None |
| Edge | Supported | 79 | 2020-01-15 | None |
| Firefox | Supported | 1 | 2004-11-09 | None |
| Safari | Supported | 1 | 2003-06-23 | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | 1 | 2007-06-29 | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | 1 | Not listed | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | 5.0 | 2016-12-15 | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | TLS ClientHello parsing at CDN or server |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | Not listed |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Not listed |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- Capture ClientHello
- Concatenate fields
- MD5
- Match against known hashes
Data you get
What comes back: 32 hex characters
Shape: string
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ja3_hash | string | None | MD5 | exact, but unstable on Chrome 110 and later |
Technical limits
- Chrome randomization makes the hash non-stable
- Easy to spoof with curl-impersonate or uTLS
The story
What it is
The way your browser starts a secure connection leaves a pattern that names the software you use.
For you
You never see it. Before any page loads, your browser says hello in a particular order. Servers can turn that order into a short code that points to your browser family.
For makers
Makers use it to tell real Chrome or Safari apart from scripts and bots pretending to be them. It happens before any page code runs, so it is hard to fake. Browsers now shuffle the order, which weakens it.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| security | A ticket site gets a flood of requests that say they are Chrome. The secure handshake code matches a Python script, so the site blocks them before the sale opens. | None named |
| ads | An ad network checks that clicks come from real browsers. Clicks with a known bot handshake code are dropped and not billed to the advertiser. | None named |
| games | A browser game's login server blocks a cheating tool that automates logins, because its handshake matches a known tool and not a normal browser. | None named |
| shopping | A sneaker store uses the handshake code to spot buying bots that fake a browser name, so real shoppers get a fairer chance. | None named |
| analytics | A bot defence service lists the most common handshake codes in its traffic and sets alarms when a rare one suddenly appears. | Cloudflare |
| banking | A bank's login page treats a handshake that does not match the claimed browser as a warning sign and adds a challenge. | None named |
| developer | A developer scraping a site with a plain script gets blocked, and learns the site compares the handshake code with the browser name sent. | None named |
Risks
- Hard to see or avoid
- Wrong blocks of rare browsers
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Bot detection, malware C2 detection
Known abuse
- Persistent client identification across IPs
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 2 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 4 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 3 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2023-01, Chrome 110: TLS extension order randomized, breaking static JA3 hashes
- 2023-01, Firefox: Firefox keeps fixed order
Related capabilities
Related
- JA4+ network fingerprint family. Can recognize your browser or app from several quiet network clues, even when shuffled
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.