WebRTC local IP discovery
Uses a WebRTC peer connection to learn the device's local and public IP addresses.
In one line
Can try to learn your device's home network address and public address through a call setup
Uses a WebRTC peer connection to learn the device's local and public IP addresses.
Can reveal a real IP behind a VPN and LAN addresses. Browsers now often hide local addresses behind mDNS names. LinkedIn uses stun.l.google.com:19302 and an IP regex.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. A page can start a call setup without a pop up
It can
- Ask an outside server for your public address
- See a masked .local name for your home network address in most browsers
- See your real home network address if you allowed camera or microphone
- Compare addresses to spot a VPN
It cannot
- See your real home network address by default in modern browsers
- Beat a VPN that carries call traffic too
- See other devices on your network from this alone
- Work without a script running on the page
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | 56 | 2017-01-25 | Local IPs masked by mDNS since about Chrome 75 |
| Edge | Supported | 15 | 2017-04-05 | None |
| Firefox | Supported | 44 | 2016-01-26 | None |
| Safari | Supported | 11 | 2017-09-19 | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | 11 | 2017-09-19 | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | 56 | 2017-02-01 | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | 6.0 | 2017-08-23 | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | new RTCPeerConnection({iceServers:[{urls:'stun:stun.l.google.com:19302'}]}), onicecandidate |
| Browser compat keys | api.RTCPeerConnection |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | None (no browser prompt) |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Not listed |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- Script reads the value
- Value joins the fingerprint payload
Data you get
What comes back: WebRTC local IP discovery
Shape: list
How often: read on demand
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ip | list | None | local and public candidates | exact |
Technical limits
- mDNS hides host addresses by default
- STUN request also leaks the public IP to Google
The story
What it is
A page can use a call feature to learn your device's home network address and public address.
For you
You never see it. A page can quietly start a call setup and read the addresses it finds. Modern browsers hide the home address behind a random name, but the public one may still show.
For makers
Makers need these addresses to connect calls and games directly. Tracking and fraud scripts also read them to see past some VPNs. Privacy settings can block this, but may break calls.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| video | Browser video calls such as Google Meet gather addresses so your computer and the other person's can connect directly. | Google Meet |
| games | A browser multiplayer game with peer to peer links finds addresses of all players so they can connect without a central relay. | None named |
| video | A cloud gaming page builds a live video path to the game server using the paths found by this feature. | GeForce NOW, Xbox Cloud Gaming |
| security | A fraud tool reads the public address found by the call setup to see if it differs from the page request address, which may show a VPN. | None named |
| ads | A tracking script reads the addresses to tell devices apart, a trick browsers now limit. | None named |
| social | A web voice chat joins a room and shares your path with friends so audio stays low delay. | Discord |
| developer | A developer uses a leak test page to check what a site can learn through calls. | BrowserLeaks |
Risks
- VPN leak
- Used to unmask visitors
What the platform says
- MDN Web Docs: RTCPeerConnection. The call building block that gathers network paths so two browsers can connect directly.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Peer to peer calls
Known abuse
- VPN bypass
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 4 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 3 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 3 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
A real example: LinkedIn
Collector key(s): webrtc. STUN stun.l.google.com:19302 and IP regex.
Related capabilities
Related
- APFC / DNA device fingerprint (abuse prevention features). Can collect about 48 device traits and send them in secret with later requests
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.