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Platform.Ontology

Active extension probe (AED)

Fetches a hidden file from each of thousands of known extension IDs to learn which ones are installed.

Used to track youDevice detailsBrowser extensionsWeb browsersWhen the page loadsWhile you use itWhen you are signed in

In one line

Can check which of thousands of known browser extensions you have installed

Fetches a hidden file from each of thousands of known extension IDs to learn which ones are installed.

Reveals installed add-ons, which can imply job search, sales role, religion, health or politics, and a stable identifier for the browser profile. LinkedIn calls it abuse prevention; critics call it covert profiling.

What it can and can't do

What the user does: Nothing. It happens when you open the site in Chrome or Edge.

It can

  • Test a long list of known extension IDs, one by one
  • Tell which of those extensions are installed
  • Use the result as a stable fingerprint of your browser profile
  • Send the list of detected extensions to its servers

It cannot

  • See extensions that are not on its list
  • See what an extension does or the data inside it
  • Work in Firefox, Safari or most phone browsers
  • Find extensions that keep their files hidden from web pages

How it differs between platforms: Works in Chrome and Edge only. Firefox, Safari and phone browsers block it.

Browser support

BrowserStatusFirst versionReleasedNote
ChromeSupportedNot availableNot listedNeeds chrome-extension:// scheme
EdgeSupported792020-01-15Chromium Edge: UA contains Chrome, extension IDs from the Chrome Web Store work if installed there
FirefoxNot supportedNot availableNot listedmoz-extension URLs use per-install random UUIDs, so IDs cannot be guessed
SafariNot supportedNot availableNot listedSafari extension URLs are per-install random
Safari on iPhoneNot supportedNot availableNot listedNone
Chrome on AndroidNot supportedNot availableNot listedChrome for Android has no extension support
Samsung InternetNot supportedNot availableNot listedNone

How a site asks for it

APIfetch('chrome-extension://<id>/<file>') per list entry, Promise.allSettled; fulfilled = installed
How access is grantednone
What the user seesNone (no browser prompt)
Needs a secure context (HTTPS)No
Needs a user gestureNo
How long it lastsRuns on page load for every visit; result is sent once per run if any ID is found
How to take it backNot listed
Inside an iframeNot listed

Typical flow

  1. Script checks navigator.userAgent contains 'Chrome' and that it is not server side
  2. For each hardcoded {id, file} pair, fetch chrome-extension://id/file
  3. A fulfilled fetch means the extension is installed and exposes that file in web_accessible_resources
  4. Collected IDs are sent as AedEvent.browserExtensionIds through the tracking payload, only if the list is non-empty
  5. Later versions add staggered scanning, requestIdleCallback and a 2000 ms timeout (per BrowserGate)

Data you get

What comes back: Set of installed extension IDs out of the probe list
Shape: list
How often: every page load or session start

FieldTypeUnitRangePrecision
browserExtensionIdslistextension IDs0 to list size (2,953 in the public snapshot, 6,236 claimed Apr 2026)32 char lowercase ID each
probe_list_sizeintegerIDs2,000 (2025 gist) to 6,236 (Apr 2026 claim)exact

Technical limits

  • Only Chromium browsers with chrome-extension:// URLs
  • Only finds extensions that list a file in web_accessible_resources
  • Manifest V3 use_dynamic_url randomizes the URL so those extensions cannot be probed
  • Cannot read extension data, only presence

The story

What it is

A site quietly tests thousands of known browser add-on addresses to learn which add-ons you have installed.

For you

You see nothing at all. While the page loads, it tries thousands of hidden add-on addresses in the background. The answer is a list of which add-ons your browser has.

For makers

The site says this catches scraping and automation tools that break its rules. Critics say the same list can hint at your job, beliefs or health, and acts as a steady ID for your browser.

Where you see it

TypeExampleApps
securityA professional network checks for known scraper add-ons when a profile gets viewed hundreds of times in a minute, then limits the account.LinkedIn
securityA sneaker or concert ticket site looks for auto-buyer add-ons before a big drop and sends those visitors to extra checks.None named
gamesA browser game with real prizes looks for auto-clicker or cheat add-ons before a ranked match starts.None named
adsAn ad network adds the add-on list to its other clues so it can tell a returning browser from a new one.None named
analyticsA fraud team compares add-on lists across thousands of new accounts and finds a cluster of fake profiles that all share the same odd set.None named
enterpriseA sales software maker spots a rival's sales add-on in a visitor's browser, which critics call competitor snooping.LinkedIn
socialA platform could guess that someone is job hunting from a resume or job alert add-on, which privacy groups warn about.None named

Risks

  • Reveals private traits
  • Hidden stable ID
  • No prompt or consent

Good uses and abuse

Legitimate uses

  • Detect scraper and automation extensions that abuse the site
  • Block known data harvesting tools

Known abuse

  • Profiling users by installed extensions (religion, health, job hunting, rivals' tools)
  • Competitor tool detection
  • Stable fingerprint component

Scores

ScoreValueMeaning
Sensitivity4 of 5How revealing the data is
Utility3 of 5How useful it is to honest apps
Friction0 of 5How much the user has to do
Fingerprint bits12Rough identifying entropy, when known

A real example: LinkedIn

Core of BrowserGate. LinkedIn script loops a hardcoded extension ID list (2,953 IDs in the public mdp snapshot, 6,236 claimed Apr 2026) and fetches each chrome-extension:// resource. Verified in the snapshot; LinkedIn says it is for abuse prevention.

History

  • 2025, Chrome: About 2,000 IDs listed in a public gist (cited by BleepingComputer)
  • 2026-04, Chrome: BrowserGate reports 6,236 IDs; public snapshot has 2,953

Sources

How well checked: Checked against real behavior.

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