Browsing history
Sites cannot read which other sites you visited.
In one line
Can't see which other sites you have visited
Sites cannot read which other sites you visited.
:visited styling is limited since Chrome 51 and Firefox 4 (getComputedStyle lies, only color changes) so history sniffing no longer works. Proxies: cache timing, HSTS and partitioned storage are now keyed per site, and referrer shows only the prior page.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. Pages have no way to ask for this
It can
- See the one page that sent you here
- Keep its own visit history inside its own site
- Use timing tricks that are mostly closed now
It cannot
- See your history list
- Tell which links you visited by their color
- See other sites you opened
- Use shared cache tricks; storage is now split per site
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Edge | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Firefox | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Safari | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Chrome on Android | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Samsung Internet | Not supported | Not available | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | none |
| How access is granted | not-exposed |
| What the user sees | None |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | read fresh on every page load; nothing stored |
| How to take it back | not applicable |
| Inside an iframe | Readable from cross-origin iframes too (same values) |
Typical flow
- Page script reads the value
- No prompt is shown
Data you get
Shape: none
How often: static per session
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
proxy: :visited style | string | None | only color properties, always reported as unvisited | Not listed |
proxy: document.referrer | string | None | previous page, trimmed to origin by default (strict-origin-when-cross-origin) | Not listed |
proxy: history.length | string | None | number of entries in this tab, 0 to 50 | Not listed |
Technical limits
- History leaks sexuality, health
The story
What it is
Sites cannot read which other sites you have visited.
For you
Other websites cannot see where else you have been. Links you visited may be a different color, but sites cannot read that color. Your history stays with you.
For makers
History is the richest ad and profiling data there is, so many tried to sniff it using link colors. Browsers closed the trick years ago. Sites now rely on cookies, logins, timing tricks and their own logs for the same kind of insight.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| ads | An ad network wanted to know if you visited a rival store and now uses cookies on its own network instead. | None named |
| security | A phishing site used to check which bank sites you visited, which no longer works. | None named |
| shopping | A retailer wanted to know which competitors you checked and tracks its own visits only. | None named |
| news | A paywall wanted to see how many articles you read elsewhere and counts only its own. | None named |
| games | A game portal wanted to recommend games from your history, and only uses what you play on it. | None named |
| analytics | A researcher showed that cache timing can hint at visited sites, which is why browsers now split caches by site. | None named |
| banking | A bank wanted to learn which other banks you use and cannot. | None named |
Risks
- Old tricks no longer work
- Partial hints through timing and logins remain
What the platform says
- Mozilla: Plugging the CSS history leak. Mozilla explained changes that stopped sites from sniffing visited links in your history.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- None: the browser deliberately withholds it
Known abuse
- Historic sniffing attacks; now mitigated
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 5 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 2 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 3 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 0 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.