Spectroscopy DOM scan for extension traces
Walks the page's own DOM looking for chrome-extension:// strings that extensions inject.
In one line
Can look through its own page for traces that extensions leave behind
Walks the page's own DOM looking for chrome-extension:// strings that extensions inject.
Finds extensions that modify the page even when they hide their files from fetch probes. A passive second way to learn which add-ons the person runs while using the site.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. It happens while the page loads and changes.
It can
- Scan the page's own text and settings for extension web addresses
- Spot extensions that add things to the page, such as grammar or shopping tools
- Report any matches back to its servers
It cannot
- See extensions that never touch the page
- See your tabs, history or data on other sites
- See inside an extension or its private data
How it differs between platforms: Works best in Chrome and Edge. Other browsers only partly leave these traces.
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | Not available | Not listed | Chromium only in practice |
| Edge | Supported | 79 | 2020-01-15 | None |
| Firefox | Partial | Not available | Not listed | Would only see moz-extension strings if scanned for |
| Safari | Partial | Not available | Not listed | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Partial | Not available | Not listed | None |
| Chrome on Android | Partial | Not available | Not listed | None |
| Samsung Internet | Partial | Not available | Not listed | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | recursive DOM walk (scanDOMForPrefix) over text nodes and attributes; SpectroscopyEvent |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | None (no browser prompt) |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Per page; cookie spectroscopyId is session scoped |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- Recurse through DOM nodes, text and attribute values
- Match the prefix chrome-extension:// and extract the 32 char ID
- Fire SpectroscopyEvent with the found IDs
- Cookie spectroscopyId set for the session (LinkedIn: used to catch malicious activity through browser extensions)
Data you get
What comes back: Extension IDs seen in DOM
Shape: list
How often: on DOM scan
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
extension_ids | list | IDs | 0 to a handful | 32 char each |
Technical limits
- Sees only extensions that inject visible traces into the DOM
- No access to extension storage or pages
The story
What it is
A page reads its own hidden text and tags to find leftovers that your browser add-ons have injected.
For you
You never see it. Some add-ons write small marks into every page you open, like a stamp. The site reads its own page and notices the stamps.
For makers
It costs almost nothing to run and makes no extra network requests, so it is very hard to spot. Makers use it to spot bots and rule breaking tools. Critics say it also builds a profile of the person.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| security | A social site scans its own page for marks left by an automation add-on that scrolls feeds and copies profiles. | |
| ads | An ad vendor looks for marks from ad blockers on the page to decide whether to show a polite 'please turn off your ad blocker' wall. | None named |
| shopping | A price comparison site checks for coupon add-on marks so it can change how it shows deals. | None named |
| analytics | A measurement team learns that 20 percent of visitors run a grammar helper that rewrites forms, and explains odd typing data. | None named |
| security | A bank or fraud service looks for marks left by remote control or screen recording add-ons during a login. | None named |
| games | A game site spots add-ons that inject overlays into the page, which can be used to cheat in browser games. | None named |
| enterprise | A company checks that staff browsers run the approved security add-on before showing a work app. | None named |
Risks
- Quiet profiling
- Hard to notice
- Add-ons can be personal
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Spot extensions injecting content into the app
Known abuse
- Profiling by installed extensions
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 3 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 2 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 6 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
A real example: LinkedIn
Cookie table lists spectroscopyId as catching malicious activity through browser extensions. Code in the public snapshot has scanDOMForPrefix and parseFoundString for chrome-extension:// and fires SpectroscopyEvent.
Related capabilities
Related
- Active extension probe (AED). Can check which of thousands of known browser extensions you have installed
Sources
- mdp/linkedin-extension-fingerprinting (LinkedIn script snapshot and ID list)
- LinkedIn cookie table
- BrowserGate: how it works (48 feature table)
How well checked: Checked against real behavior.