Legacy navigator properties (appName, appVersion, platform, vendor ...)
Frozen strings such as appName, appVersion, appCodeName, platform, product, productSub, vendor and vendorSub.
In one line
Can see old fixed labels naming your browser maker, OS family, and engine
Frozen strings such as appName, appVersion, appCodeName, platform, product, productSub, vendor and vendorSub.
Mostly frozen for compatibility, but platform and vendor still differ by OS and engine. Used for consistency checks against the user agent.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. It happens when the page loads
It can
- Check old browser strings like appName, platform, and vendor
- Compare them with the user agent to spot fakes
- Tell the engine (Chromium, Safari, Firefox) apart
It cannot
- See your exact OS version
- See your name, location, or accounts
- Learn much; many values are frozen for compatibility
- Tell similar browsers apart on their own
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Supported | 1 | 2008-12-11 | None |
| Edge | Supported | 12 | 2015-07-29 | None |
| Firefox | Supported | 1 | 2004-11-09 | None |
| Safari | Supported | 1 | 2003-06-23 | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | 1 | 2007-06-29 | None |
| Chrome on Android | Supported | 18 | 2012-06-27 | None |
| Samsung Internet | Supported | 1.0 | 2013-04-27 | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | navigator.appName, appVersion, appCodeName, platform, product, productSub, vendor, vendorSub |
| Browser compat keys | api.Navigator.platformapi.Navigator.vendor |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | None (no browser prompt) |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Not listed |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- Script reads the value
- Value joins the fingerprint payload
Data you get
What comes back: Legacy navigator properties (appName, appVersion, platform, vendor ...)
Shape: string
How often: static
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
platform | string | None | e.g. MacIntel, Win32, Linux x86_64 | Not listed |
vendor | string | None | Google Inc., Apple Computer, Inc., empty for Firefox | Not listed |
productSub | string | None | 20030107 or 20100101 | Not listed |
Technical limits
- Spec says they are legacy constants
- Easy to spoof
The story
What it is
Old fixed text fields, like app name and vendor, that still differ a little by system and engine.
For you
You never see them. They are mostly frozen for old websites. A few still differ between systems, which lets a site cross check that you are who your browser says you are.
For makers
These strings exist so old sites do not break. Modern sites use them in consistency checks. When privacy tools or bots change one value but forget another, the mismatch stands out.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| security | A bot defence service checks that the vendor, platform and user agent agree and challenges those that do not. | Cloudflare, DataDome |
| ads | An ad fraud vendor verifies that browser identity strings are consistent before counting a view. | DoubleVerify |
| developer | An old script reads appName and appVersion to guess the browser, which still works for basic cases. | None named |
| banking | A bank risk engine adds suspicion when two strings disagree. | None named |
| analytics | A fingerprinting library mixes the strings into a device ID. | FingerprintJS |
| games | A browser games platform checks these strings to pick the right controls layout for the engine. | None named |
Risks
- Low value alone, but combined
- Can wrongly flag privacy tools
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Compat checks
Known abuse
- Engine and OS fingerprint
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 1 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 3 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 1 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
A real example: LinkedIn
Collector key(s): appName, appVersion, appCodeName, platform, product, productSub, vendor, vendorSub.
Related capabilities
Related
- APFC / DNA device fingerprint (abuse prevention features). Can collect about 48 device traits and send them in secret with later requests
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.