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Platform.Ontology

AudioContext rendering fingerprint

Renders a silent tone through an audio graph offline and sums the output samples.

Used to track youGraphics and fingerprintingAudioWeb browsersWhen the page loads

In one line

Can run a silent sound test and turn the result into a device number

Renders a silent tone through an audio graph offline and sums the output samples.

Tiny floating point differences in the audio stack (DynamicsCompressor, oscillator math, CPU SIMD) give a number that is stable per browser build and hardware. It never plays sound.

What it can and can't do

What the user does: Nothing. It happens when the page loads

It can

  • Render a quiet tone in memory and add up the results
  • Turn those tiny differences into one repeatable number
  • Match that number across visits, even with cookies cleared

It cannot

  • Play anything you can hear
  • Use your microphone
  • Work the same way in Brave, Safari 26 and Firefox private mode, which add noise
  • Identify you by name alone

How it differs between platforms: Brave, Firefox in strict or private mode and Safari 26 add noise to the result. Chrome and Edge do not.

Browser support

BrowserStatusFirst versionReleasedNote
ChromeSupported352014-05-20None
EdgeSupported122015-07-29None
FirefoxSupported252013-10-29None
SafariSupported14.12021-04-26None
Safari on iPhoneSupported14.52021-04-26None
Chrome on AndroidSupported352014-05-20None
Samsung InternetSupported3.02015-04-10None

How a site asks for it

APInew OfflineAudioContext(1,44100,44100); createOscillator(); createDynamicsCompressor(); startRendering()
Browser compat keysapi.OfflineAudioContext
api.DynamicsCompressorNode
How access is grantednone
What the user seesNot listed
Needs a secure context (HTTPS)No
Needs a user gestureNo
How long it lastsNot listed
How to take it backNot listed
Inside an iframeNot listed

Typical flow

  1. Build triangle oscillator into compressor
  2. startRendering()
  3. Sum abs of a slice of the Float32Array
  4. Hash or keep as float

Data you get

What comes back: Sum of about 500 samples, 15 digit float
Shape: float

FieldTypeUnitRangePrecision
fingerprint sumfloatNoneabout 124.04 for Chrome desktopvaries at the 1e-14 level by browser

Technical limits

  • Mostly identifies browser and OS build, not individual devices
  • Same hardware with same browser collides
  • Safari and Brave perturb output

The story

What it is

A script plays a silent tone through a sound chain offline and adds up the numbers to make an ID.

For you

Nothing you can see or hear happens. Your device does a small math job, and the answer is nearly the same every time, so it can recognize you without cookies.

For makers

It is one of the classic fingerprinting tricks. It needs no permission and adds extra bits to a visitor ID. Fraud teams like it because it survives cookie clearing and private windows in some browsers.

Where you see it

TypeExampleApps
adsAn ad broker links your visits across unrelated sites by checking the same audio result each time.None named
securityA login page compares the audio result to the one stored when you set up the account, and asks for more proof if it differs.None named
analyticsA site counting unique visitors uses it to tell apart two people on the same office network.FingerprintJS
shoppingA shop spots one person making hundreds of accounts to abuse a coupon, because the audio result matches.None named
gamesA game with a free trial limit stops people from creating new accounts again and again on the same device.None named
bankingA bank adds the audio result to its device recognition so a stolen password alone is not enough.None named
socialA social site finds the same person behind a fake follower network using shared device traits.None named

Risks

  • Hard to avoid without breaking audio
  • Works across sites
  • Privacy browsers add noise on purpose

Good uses and abuse

Legitimate uses

  • Audio capability checks

Known abuse

  • Cheap fingerprint component that survives cookie clearing

Scores

ScoreValueMeaning
Sensitivity3 of 5How revealing the data is
Utility1 of 5How useful it is to honest apps
Friction0 of 5How much the user has to do
Fingerprint bits5Rough identifying entropy, when known

History

  • 2016-05, paper: Englehardt and Narayanan find audio fingerprinting scripts on the web
  • 2023-09, Safari 17: Web Audio readback noise in Private Browsing
  • 2025-09, Safari 26: Noise extended to all browsing for known fingerprinting scripts

Sources

How well checked: Based on official documentation.

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