Tor Browser uniformity and letterboxing
Tor Browser makes all users look the same: fixed fonts, letterboxed window, canvas prompt.
In one line
Can't tell Tor Browser users apart, since everyone looks the same
Tor Browser makes all users look the same: fixed fonts, letterboxed window, canvas prompt.
Standardizes fonts, screen size in 200x100 steps, UTC timezone and en-US locale. Canvas readback needs a prompt. Goal is one crowd, not noise, which yields about zero bits when users keep defaults.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: You open Tor Browser. It works by default
It can
- Show every visitor the same fonts, time zone and language
- Round the window size to fixed steps so many people match
- Ask you before the site can see canvas pictures
It cannot
- Be a clean match if you resize the window or turn off its protections
- Hide that you use Tor, which sites can still guess
- Stop sites that follow you with a login
How it differs between platforms: Only Tor Browser works this way. Other browsers add noise or block only some checks.
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Edge | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Firefox | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Safari | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Safari on iPhone | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Chrome on Android | Not supported | Not available | None |
| Samsung Internet | Not supported | Not available | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | Tor Browser (Firefox ESR based, Safest level disables JS) |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | Not listed |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Not listed |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- RFP spoofs timezone, locale, hardware
- Letterboxing rounds inner window size
- Canvas extraction prompts the person
Data you get
What comes back: Uniform values for all users
Shape: none
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
window width | integer | px | 200 to 1600 | rounded to 200 steps, height to 100 steps |
Technical limits
- Resizing, extra fonts or JS toggles break uniformity
- Exit node IPs are public and blockable
The story
What it is
Tor Browser makes every user look the same: fixed fonts, a letterboxed window and a prompt before canvas reads.
For you
Windows open at standard sizes with gray bars around the page, called letterboxing. Some sites look plain, and canvas reads may ask your permission. In return you blend into a crowd.
For makers
Tor's design goal is that everyone gives the same answers. Sites that need strong fraud checks often hit more captchas or blocks, so makers have to decide whether to allow privacy first users.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| security | A bank sees a login from Tor with identical device traits to thousands of others and applies extra checks. | None named |
| news | A journalism site or a whistleblower portal welcomes Tor, so readers in risky places can read without being tracked. | The New York Times onion site, BBC onion site |
| social | A social network that blocks Tor for spam fights, but runs a hidden onion address for people in censored countries. | Facebook onion site |
| ads | An ad network gets the same device answers for every Tor visitor, so it cannot build a profile. | None named |
| shopping | A store sees many Tor users share one profile and flags orders, which can block honest buyers. | None named |
| games | A browser game with graphics tests runs, but fine graphics settings may look basic because the browser hides details. | None named |
| education | A student in a country with censorship reads a banned encyclopedia page with no fingerprint to follow. | None named |
Risks
- Sites may block or challenge Tor
- Slower and plainer pages
- Resizing the window can undo the benefit
What the platform says
- Tor Project: Tor Browser design. Tor says its browser aims to make all users look alike, so no one can be singled out by device details.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Anonymity
Known abuse
- Detect Tor via exit list, unusual JS defaults
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 1 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 2 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 3 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | Not rated | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2019-05, Firefox 67: Letterboxing upstreamed to Firefox RFP
Related capabilities
Related
- Firefox Fingerprinting Protection and RFP. Can't be fingerprinted as easily in Firefox strict mode or Private Browsing
- VPN, proxy and Tor detection. Can guess whether you are hiding behind a VPN, proxy or Tor, but not always correctly
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.