Safari Advanced Fingerprinting Protection
Safari limits what known fingerprinting scripts can read and perturbs canvas and audio readback.
In one line
Can't use many device traits in Safari to tell you apart
Safari limits what known fingerprinting scripts can read and perturbs canvas and audio readback.
Safari 17 enabled it in Private Browsing. Safari 26 (iOS 26, macOS 26) extends it to all browsing by default, restricting known fingerprinting scripts from reading screen size, core count, voices, Web Audio and 2D canvas.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: Nothing. Safari does it by default, in all browsing in Safari 26
It can
- Limit what known fingerprinting scripts can see
- Add noise to canvas and audio results
- Keep pages working as normal
It cannot
- Stop every fingerprinting script, since the limits aim at known ones
- Hide that you use Safari
- Protect older iOS and macOS versions that came before 26 outside Private Browsing
How it differs between platforms: Safari 17 to 25 protect only in Private Browsing. Safari 26 on iOS and macOS protects all browsing.
Browser support
| Browser | Status | First version | Released | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Not supported | Not available | Not listed | None |
| Edge | Not supported | Not available | Not listed | None |
| Firefox | Not supported | Not available | Not listed | None |
| Safari | Supported | 17 | 2023-09-18 | Private Browsing; default for all browsing in 26 |
| Safari on iPhone | Supported | 17 | 2023-09-18 | Same on iOS; default for all browsing in 26 |
| Chrome on Android | Not supported | Not available | Not listed | None |
| Samsung Internet | Not supported | Not available | Not listed | None |
How a site asks for it
| API | Safari Settings > Advanced > Advanced fingerprinting protection |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | Not listed |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Not listed |
| How to take it back | Not listed |
| Inside an iframe | Not listed |
Typical flow
- WebKit identifies known fingerprinting scripts
- Restricts or perturbs high-entropy APIs for those scripts
- Stops them setting long-lived cookies or localStorage
Data you get
What comes back: Applied only to scripts on WebKit's known-fingerprinter lists, plus noise in Private mode
Shape: none
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
scope | enum | None | Private only (17 to 25), all browsing (26) | by setting |
Technical limits
- Targets known scripts, so new or first-party scripts may not be restricted
- Secondary sources disagree on how much noise is applied outside Private mode
The story
What it is
Safari limits what known fingerprinting scripts can read and adds small noise to canvas and audio readback.
For you
You turn nothing on and pages mostly look the same. Safari quietly makes your device look more like other Apple devices, so ad scripts have a harder time telling you apart.
For makers
Apple uses privacy as a major pitch for iPhone and Mac. Makers who use fingerprints for fraud or ad measurement get less detail from Safari and must rely on logins, first party data or Apple's own attribution tools.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| ads | An ad network that tries to hash your canvas in Safari gets a slightly scrambled answer, so it cannot follow you around the web. | None named |
| security | A bank cannot count on device traits from Safari, so it leans more on login history and Face ID passkeys. | None named |
| games | A WebGL game in Safari still renders normally because the noise only touches fingerprint style readbacks. | None named |
| analytics | A site that counts unique visitors sees blurrier numbers from Safari and uses first party cookies or logins instead. | None named |
| shopping | A retailer measuring ad clicks uses Safari's built in attribution, not a fingerprint, to see which ad led to a sale. | None named |
| social | A social network cannot easily link a Safari visitor to a logged out profile, so it nudges people to sign in. | None named |
| news | A news site's paywall counts articles by login in Safari, because device matching is less steady. | None named |
Risks
- Can still miss new tricks
- Some site features may break
What the platform says
- Apple: Advanced Fingerprinting Protection. Apple says Safari's stronger tracking defense makes it harder for sites to build a profile from your device details.
- WebKit: Tracking Prevention. WebKit describes its policy of stopping cross site tracking and limiting fingerprinting surface.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Privacy by default for Safari users
Known abuse
- Hardest iOS desktop fingerprinting, still measurable via fonts and coarse hardware
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 1 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 3 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | Not rated | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
History
- 2023-09, Safari 17: Advanced Tracking and Fingerprinting Protection in Private Browsing, canvas and audio noise
- 2025-09, Safari 26: Extended to all browsing by default, with targeted API limits and storage limits for known fingerprinters
Related capabilities
Related
- Canvas 2D fingerprint. Can turn a hidden drawing into a device number that works without cookies
- AudioContext rendering fingerprint. Can run a silent sound test and turn the result into a device number
- speechSynthesis voice list. Can list the spoken voices installed on your device
Sources
How well checked: Checked against real behavior.