Extension probe defenses
Browsers blunt the trick of probing for installed extensions by their fixed addresses.
A page can test chrome-extension://id/file for extensions that expose resources. Chromium MV3 use_dynamic_url and Firefox's per install random address make that probe unreliable, and Safari does not expose stable ids.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: None, the page reads it silently
It can
- Make the extension address change per session in Chromium MV3
- Give each Firefox install its own random address
It cannot
- Stop DOM and global injection traces
- Protect extensions that do not opt in
How it differs between platforms: Chromium needs the extension author to opt in. Firefox always randomizes.
Browser support
Version notes
- Chrome: use_dynamic_url is an opt in per resource entry
- Edge: Partial, medium confidence
- Firefox: Random UUID per install blocks cross site fingerprinting, but a leaked UUID works within a session
- Safari: safari-web-extension scheme. Packaging details are low confidence
- Safari on iPhone: Safari scheme as on Mac
- Chrome on Android: No extensions
How a site asks for it
| API | web_accessible_resources with use_dynamic_url (Chromium MV3); moz-extension://UUID; safari-web-extension:// |
| Browser compat keys | webextensions.manifest.web_accessible_resources |
| How access is granted | none |
| What the user sees | None, set by the extension author |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | Yes |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | Per origin |
| How to take it back | Clear site data |
| Inside an iframe | Same as top level |
Typical flow
- Page calls the API
- Browser answers with no prompt
- Page reads the result
Data you get
What comes back: Browsers blunt the trick of probing for installed extensions by their fixed addresses.
Shape: object
How often: on demand
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
use_dynamic_url | boolean | None | per resource entry | Not listed |
moz-extension UUID | string | None | random per install | Not listed |
Technical limits
- Chromium MV3 only for use_dynamic_url
- Safari packaging details are low confidence
The story
What it is
Defenses that stop a page from learning your extensions by guessing their addresses.
For you
Your extensions are harder to list from a web page when they use these defenses.
For makers
Extension authors enable use_dynamic_url to protect their users.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| productivity | A password manager enables dynamic URLs so websites cannot detect it. | None named |
Risks
- Not all extensions opt in
What the platform says
- Mozilla: web_accessible_resources. Explains how Firefox randomizes extension addresses per install.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- Privacy for extension users
Known abuse
- None
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 1 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 3 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 0 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | Not rated | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
Related capabilities
Related
- Extension presence probing. Can find out which Chrome extensions you have by testing known files
- Extension traces in the DOM and globals. Can spot some of your extensions from what they add to the page
Sources
- Chrome web_accessible_resources (checked 2026-11-16)
- MDN web_accessible_resources (WebExtensions) (checked 2026-11-16)
- MDN browser-compat-data 8.1.9 (checked 2026-11-16)
How well checked: Inferred from related behavior.